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Civil Rights, Access to Counsel, and Injunctive Class
Actions in the United States
Maureen Carroll
2.1 INTRODUCTION
According to a familiar story about class actions in the United States, aggregation promotes
access to counsel by increasing the amount of money from which counsel fees can be taken.1
Courts usually award class counsel a percentage of the monetary recovery obtained on behalf of
the class,2 and class treatment can turn a $30 case into a $3 million case. But what about class
actions that do not involve monetary relief at all?
Some civil rights plaintiffs seek to stop a violation, rather than to obtain compensation for past
harm, and therefore choose to pursue only an injunction or declaratory judgment. Other civil
rights plaintiffs have no choice but to pursue only injunctive or declaratory relief, for reasons
ranging from statutory constraints to immunity doctrines.3 Unlike in aggregated-damages cases,
class treatment in injunction-only cases does not have a multiplicative effect that makes the
litigation more lucrative − and thus more attractive − from a law firm’s perspective.4 Indeed, one
might expect that the prospect of class certification would decrease access to counsel in such
cases, because federally funded legal aid organizations are prohibited from working on class
actions.5
1 The United States Supreme Court has referred to this access-promoting effect as “[t]he policy at the very core of the
class action mechanism.” Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit
Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)).
2 See infra Section 2.3.
3 See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (holding that that qualified immunity limits a plaintiff’s ability to
recover monetary damages from government officials); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (holding that the
Eleventh Amendment limits a plaintiff’s ability to recover monetary relief from state defendants); Samuel
R. Bagenstos, The Perversity of Limited Civil Rights Remedies: The Case of “Abusive” ADA Litigation, 54 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 2 (2006) (noting that the public accommodations title of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 does
not authorize private plaintiffs to seek damages).
4 Class treatment might increase the remedial cost to the defendant in an injunction-only case, but it might not. See
Maureen Carroll, Class Action Myopia, 65 DUKE L.J. 843, 866–68 (2016). In any event, the counsel fee in an
injunction-only case will not generally increase in proportion to the defendant’s remedial cost. See infra Section 2.3.
5 See 45 C.F.R. § 1617.3 (prohibiting recipients of federal Legal Services Corporation funding from “initiating or
participating in any class action”); see also Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 164 F.3d 757 (2d Cir. 1999), aff’d, 531U.S.
533 (2001) (rejecting statutory and constitutional challenges to this restriction). This restriction applies at the entity
level, such that any legal organization that receives LSC funding cannot work on a class action even if it uses non-LSC
funds to do so. An LSC-funded organization can coordinate its activities with an affiliate that does work on class
actions (or engages in other restricted activities), but only if it maintains legal, physical, and financial separation from
any such affiliate. See 45 C.F.R. § 1610.7. As a result, “[i]n many states, justice planners have had to set up two,
duplicative legal aid systems in order to ensure that state and other funds are not constrained by the non-LSC funds
25
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This chapter will explore the relationship between class treatment and access to counsel in
injunction-only civil rights cases. It will demonstrate that class certification does promote access
to counsel in such cases, but through a different set of mechanisms than those at play when
a plaintiff class seeks monetary relief. Broadly speaking, while aggregated-damages class actions
can attract counsel through the prospect of money-making,6 injunction-only class actions can
attract counsel through the prospect of resource-leveraging.7
Through its effects on areas ranging from justiciability to remedial scope, the injunctive class
action offers a resource-constrained legal organization the prospect of broadening its impact
without a commensurate increase in spending. Accordingly, class treatment can both increase
the attractiveness of taking on the representation and expand the group of claimants served by the
representation that takes place.
2.2 A BRIEF HISTORY OF RULE 23
This section provides an overview of the federal class action rule, from its initial adoption several
decades ago to the role it plays in aggregate litigation today. Scholars have traced the roots of the
American class action back to medieval times.8 For a briefer history, the year 1934 provides
a useful entry point.
2.2.1 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
In 1934, Congress gave the United States Supreme Court “the power to prescribe general rules of
practice and procedure” for cases heard in the federal court system.9 The Court, in turn,
appointed an Advisory Committee of attorneys and academics responsible for drafting those
procedures (and, subsequently, for amending them as needed).10
The Advisory Committee’s initial work resulted in the adoption, in 1938, of a single set of
procedural rules to govern civil lawsuits in federal district courts.11 The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure remain in place today, though they have been amended multiple times. The Federal
Rules do not directly apply to the independent court systems run by each state, but over time,
most states have adopted procedural rules modeled after them.12
restriction.” RebekahDiller &Emily Savner,Restoring Legal Aid for the Poor: A Call to EndDraconian andWasteful
Restrictions, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 687, 689 (2009).
6 See infra Section 2.3. 7 See infra Section 2.4.
8 See generally STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987);
Robert G. Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the History of Adjudicative Representation,
70 B.U. L. REV. 213 (1990).
9 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (“The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and
procedure and rules of evidence for cases in theUnited States district courts (including proceedings beforemagistrate
judges thereof) and courts of appeals.”).
10 See Brooke D. Coleman, #SoWhiteMale: Federal Civil Rulemaking, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 407, 411–12 (2018).
Currently, “there are more judges and fewer academics on the Committee, flipping the original composition of
solely practitioners and professors.” Id. at 412.
11 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (stating that, with limited exceptions, “[t]hese rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and
proceedings in the United States district courts”).
12 See John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil
Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 1369 (1986) (noting “the pervasive influence of the Federal Rules on at least some
part of every state’s civil procedure”).But see John B. Oakley,A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV.
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Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs class actions, setting forth conditions
under which one or more members of a class can sue or be sued “on behalf of all.”13 In the
original version of the rule, class certification required that “the right sought to be enforced for or
against the class” must fit into one of three categories.14 The binding effect of the judgment
depended on which of those three categories applied: in “true” and “hybrid” class actions the
judgment bound the entire class, while in “spurious” class actions it bound only the named
parties (including intervenors).15
Courts and litigants struggled to understand the “obscure and uncertain” terminology in the
1938 version of the rule.16 In addition, some objected to the “one-way” intervention prevalent in
spurious class actions, in which courts essentially allowed claimants to wait for a decision on the
merits before deciding whether they would join the class.17The rule was widely understood to be
a failed effort, eventually prompting the Advisory Committee to consider significant reforms.18
2.2.2 The 1966 Amendments
Rule 23 took on its modern structure through an extensive set of amendments that went into
effect in 1966.19 Under the modern version of the rule, each class action must satisfy a set of four
prerequisites: numerosity,20 commonality,21 typicality,22 and adequacy of representation.23 Each
class action must also fall into one of four categories, which are set forth in Rule 23(b).24
The modern version of Rule 23 is transsubstantive, meaning that it is “written to apply broadly
regardless of the nature of the underlying substantive claim.”25 At the same time, the drafters of
the 1966 amendments intended for the rule to facilitate effective remedies in civil rights
litigation.26 That intent found expression in Rule 23(b)(2), which applies when “the party
13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
14 Specifically, the 1938 version of the rule required the right to be
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a primary right refuses to enforce that right and
a member of the class thereby becomes entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which do or may affect specific property
involved in the action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and common relief is sought.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (1938).
15 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 – Advisory Committee Note to 1966 Amendments. 16 Id.
17 See Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 385 (1967).
18 See David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm Und Drang, 1953–1980, 90 WASH. U.L.
REV. 587, 600–01 (2013).
19 SeeMaureen Carroll, Class Action Myopia, 65 DUKE L.J. 843, 852 (2016); David Marcus, The History of the Modern
Class Action, Part I: Sturm Und Drang, 1953–1980, 90 WASH. U.L. REV. 587, 588 (2013).
20 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) (“the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable”).
21 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) (“there are questions of law or fact common to the class”).
22 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3) (“the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class”).
23 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) (“the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class”).
24 Two of these categories are discussed infra notes 26–32 and accompanying text. The others, which appear in
Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and (B), apply in a much narrower set of situations and are seldom used. See generally Robert
H. Klonoff, Class Actions for Monetary Relief Under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B): Does Due Process Require
Notice and Opt-Out Rights?, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 798 (2014) (discussing the history and scope of these
provisions).
25 Robert G. Bone, Walking the Class Action Maze: Toward A More Functional Rule 23, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
1097, 1123 (2013).
26 See David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63
FLA. L. REV. 657, 702–08 (2011); see also infra Section 2.4.
Civil Rights, Access to Counsel, and Injunctive Class Actions in USA 27
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108770927.002
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Univ of Michigan Law Library, on 24 Feb 2021 at 16:22:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that
final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as
a whole.”27 In the notes it published alongside the 1966 amendments, the Advisory Committee
wrote that “[i]llustrative” of situations falling under Rule 23(b)(2) were “various actions in the
civil-rights field where a party is charged with discriminating unlawfully against a class.”28
Rule 23(b)(2) thus had its genesis in an existing (if recent) type of aggregate litigation. By
contrast, Rule 23(b)(3) was “a new category deliberately created,” as its principal author described
it.29 Rule 23(b)(3) applies when “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members” (the predominance requirement), and “a
class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy” (the superiority requirement).30 Although the text of Rule 23(b)(3) does not refer to
the remedies that class members may seek, its primary purpose and effect is to allow the
aggregation of claims for monetary relief.
Regardless of which category of Rule 23(b) applies, the judgment in a certified class action
binds every member of the class, regardless of the outcome.31 Moreover, everyone who falls
within the class definition is a member of the class by default; opting in is not required.Members
of classes certified under Rule 23(b)(3), however, must be given the chance to opt out.32
2.2.3 Modern Class-Action Practice
Hundreds of putative class actions are filed in the federal courts each month.33Due in part to the
financial incentives at play,34 a large majority of these cases involve aggregated-damages class
actions.35 Indeed, when most people in the United States think of class actions, claims for
monetary relief are surely the ones that come to mind.36
Injunction-only class actions, however, continue to be certified, and they continue to play an
important role in civil rights litigation. For example, federal courts have recently certified
injunction-only class actions in cases involving family separation at the border,37 the education
of children with disabilities,38 the health and safety of children in foster care,39 medical care for
incarcerated persons,40 and the reproductive rights of immigrant detainees,41 to name just a few.
27 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). With regard to the phrase “corresponding declaratory relief,” the Advisory Committee
explained that “[d]eclaratory relief ‘corresponds’ to injunctive relief when as a practical matter it affords injunctive
relief or serves as a basis for later injunctive relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 – Advisory Committee Note to 1966
Amendments.
28 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 – Advisory Committee Note to 1966 Amendments.
29 Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 399 (1967).
30 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
31 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 – Advisory Committee Notes to 1966 Amendments (“all class actions maintained to the end as
such will result in judgments including those whom the court finds to be members of the class, whether or not the
judgment is favorable to the class”).
32 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). The rule does not require courts to afford members of other categories of class actions the
chance to opt out. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(A).
33 See Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act on the Federal Courts: An
Empirical Analysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1723, 1751 (2008). Nearly all class actions involve the
aggregation of plaintiffs, rather than defendants. Thomas E. Willging, Laural L. Hooper, & Robert J. Niemic, An
Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 119–20 (1996).
34 See infra Section 2.3. 35 See Maureen Carroll, Class Action Myopia, 65 DUKE L.J. 843, 849 & n.27 (2016).
36 Cf. id. at 870 (characterizing modern debates about class actions).
37 See Ms. L. v. U.S Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 330 F.R.D. 284 (S.D. Cal. 2019).
38 DL v. D.C., 860 F.3d 713 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 39 B.K. v. Snyder, 922 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2019).
40 Braggs v. Dunn, 317 F.R.D. 634 (M.D. Ala. 2016). 41 J.D. v. Azar, 925 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
28 Maureen Carroll
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2.3 AGGREGATION AND MONEY-MAKING
This section discusses the relationship between class treatment and counsel profit. In particular,
it explains why aggregated-damages class actions can often harness law firms’ profit motives in
ways that injunction-only class actions cannot.
Two things bear noting at the outset. First, federal courts in the United States follow the
American Rule, which creates a default expectation that every litigant will pay for its own counsel
fees.42 Second, a class lacks the capacity to enter into a fee agreement with class counsel. A class is
merely a group of persons whose claims share certain characteristics; it has no internal govern-
ance or decision-making structure.43 Accordingly, although individual class members can make
binding commitments without judicial involvement or review, the class as a whole cannot.
Instead, the court must determine whether and how much class counsel will be paid.44
2.3.1 Common-Fund Awards
The common-fund doctrine provides that “a litigant or a lawyer who recovers a common fund for
the benefit of persons other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee
from the fund as a whole.”45 As the Supreme Court has explained, this equitable doctrine “rests
on the perception that persons who obtain the benefit of a lawsuit without contributing to its cost
are unjustly enriched at the successful litigant’s expense.”46
Although the doctrine predates the modern class action, most common-fund cases now
involve the compensation of class counsel.47 The common-fund doctrine translates neatly to
the context of class actions for monetary relief; if a court were to permit absent class members to
keep the entirety of a fund recovered on their behalf, they would be unjustly enriched at class
counsel’s expense.48
In aggregated-damages class actions, courts usually grant class counsel a percentage of the
monetary relief as a common-fund award.49 In injunction-only class actions, however, there is no
monetary recovery from which to take payment − no “fund” from which to take a common-fund
award. Because the common-fund doctrine does not apply, it cannot create a financial incentive
for a law firm to seek class treatment in an injunction-only case.
2.3.2 Fee-Shifting Awards
By congressional design, the enforcement of public law in the United States is heavily dependent
on private litigation. For example, individuals file roughly 15,000 employment discrimination
lawsuits every year, while the relevant agency files only a few hundred.50 This reliance on private
42 By contrast, “in most Western legal systems other than the United States, the prevailing norm is the English rule,
which provides that the losing party must pay the winner’s reasonable fees.” Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey
P. Miller, The English Versus the American Rule on Attorney Fees: An Empirical Study of Public Company
Contracts, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 329 (2013).
43 See generally Samuel Issacharoff, The Governance Problem in Aggregate Litigation, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3165 (2013).
44 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h) (setting forth procedures by which “the court may award reasonable attorney’s fees and
nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the parties’ agreement”).
45 Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980). 46 Id.
47
WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, 5 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 15:53 (5th ed. 2019).
48 See Charles Silver, A Restitutionary Theory of Attorneys’ Fees in Class Actions, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 713 (1991).
49 SeeBrian T. Fitzpatrick,AnEmpirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J.EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 811, 832 (2010); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees and Expenses in Class Action
Settlements: 1993–2008, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 248, 267–68 (2010).
50 See David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies As Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616, 689 & n.242 (2013).
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litigants, rather than government officials, untethers enforcement activity from the constraints
imposed by agency budgets and presidential priorities.51
Due to the important role they play in the overall enforcement regime, plaintiffs who sue to
enforce civil rights laws are sometimes called “private attorneys general.”52Many claimants cannot
afford to pay their attorneys out of pocket, however, and the contingent percentage fee − like the
common-fund doctrine − can facilitate representation only in cases that involve monetary relief.
Claims for injunctive or declaratory relief can thus fall into a gap in the market for legal
services, and because many civil rights plaintiffs seek only injunctive or declaratory relief,53 this
market gap has the potential to stymie civil rights enforcement. In an effort to prevent that result,
Congress has enacted a set of fee-shifting statutes, which allow a prevailing plaintiff to recover
a reasonable attorney’s fee from the defendant in specified types of cases.54
Even in those specified cases, however, fee-shifting statutes do not create a financial incentive
for counsel to bring injunction-only class actions. Consider a case seeking an injunction against
a state statute. If the lawsuit causes the state to repeal the statute before a court has enjoined its
enforcement, the plaintiffs will usually not be deemed eligible for a court-ordered fee.55 This
type of “strategic capitulation” can deprive counsel of fees in both class and nonclass actions.56
Alternatively, consider a case in which the defendant offers to provide all of the injunctive
relief requested, but only if the plaintiffs will waive their entitlement to a fee-shifting award.57
This type of “sacrifice offer” can occur in either a class or a nonclass action,58 but in a nonclass
case, retainer agreements and client choices can blunt its impact or lead to its rejection.59 In
a class action, however, retainer agreements do not bind the class, and class counsel must decide
whether to accept or reject a settlement offer on the absent class members’ behalf.60 Class
counsel might deem themselves obligated to accept a sacrifice offer, and as a result, they might
receive no compensation for their work on the case.61
When courts do issue statutory fee-shifting awards, the amounts are structurally under-
compensatory in both class and nonclass cases. Fee-shifting awards are not based on the number
of individuals whose rights were vindicated.62 Instead, courts calculate fee-shifting awards using
the lodestar method, which multiplies each attorney’s reasonable hourly rate by the number of
hours the attorney reasonably spent on the litigation.63 Although courts will order a fee shift only
51 See generally SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE (2010).
52 See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (“If [a civil rights plaintiff] obtains an
injunction, he does so not for himself alone but also as a ‘private attorney general,’ vindicating a policy that Congress
considered of the highest priority.”).
53 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
54 See, e.g., 42U.S.C. § 1988 (“In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of . . . title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs”).
55 See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001); see also
Maureen Carroll, Fee-Shifting Statutes and Compensation for Risk, 95 INDIANA L.J. 1021, 1030 nn. 54-56 (2020)
(discussing caveats and exceptions).
56 Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on Civil Rights: The Empirical Reality of
Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1087, 1091 (2007).
57 See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986).
58 See David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest Lawyers, 91 CAL. L. REV.
209, 241 (2003).
59 See Maureen Carroll, Fee-Shifting Statutes and Compensation for Risk, 95 INDIANA L.J. 1021, 1030 (2020).
60 After class counsel makes this initial decision, the court must review the settlement to ensure that it is “fair,
reasonable, and adequate” as to any class members who would be bound by it. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2).
61 This sequence of events occurred in Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986).
62 SeeMaureen Carroll, Aggregation for Me, but Not for Thee: The Rise of Common Claims in Non-Class Litigation, 36
CARDOZO L. REV. 2017, 2073–74 & n.324 (2015).
63 See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
30 Maureen Carroll
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if the plaintiff prevails, and the lodestar uses noncontingent hourly rates, courts will not adjust
the lodestar amount to reflect the counsel’s risk of nonpayment.64
Class treatment does not fundamentally alter the under-compensatory effects of denying
compensation for risk.65 On the one hand, seeking class certification will usually require class
counsel to do additional work (as compared to a single, nonclass case), which will drive up the
hours-worked component of the lodestar. On the other hand, the absence of risk enhancement
means that, rather than devoting time to seeking class certification in a fee-shifting case, a profit-
motivated attorney would do better to spend that time on a case paid via hourly billing.66
2.4 AGGREGATION AND RESOURCE-LEVERAGING
Under the compensation systems discussed above, a law firm will not usually have a profit motive
to seek class treatment in an injunction-only case.67 Moreover, a nonprofit law firm that receives
federal legal aid funding cannot bring a class action, regardless of the type of relief sought.68Why,
then, would any law firm bring a class action on behalf of plaintiffs seeking only injunctive relief?
A significant number of law firms in the United States exist to serve their vision of the public
interest,69 rather than to make a profit, and the bulk of these firms do not receive federal legal aid
funding.70 Instead, these public interest law organizations (PILOs) rely on private grants and
contributions, among other funding sources.71 Money is perpetually in short supply, and despite
paying dramatically below-market salaries and taking other steps to keep costs down, a PILO
generally cannot afford to take on all of the cases that would further its organizational mission.72
As this section explains, a class action offers this type of firm the potential for preserving and
amplifying the effects of the resources it expends on a particular case.
2.4.1 Effective Remedies
Class treatment can allow a PILO to make better use of its limited resources by helping to make
any resulting injunctive relief more effective. In particular, class certification helps to ensure that
64 See City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992).
65 An important qualification relates to post-decree monitoring fees, for which noncontingent hourly rates are reason-
able rather than structurally under- compensatory, because the plaintiffs’ fee eligibility has already been established.
See Maureen Carroll, Fee-Shifting Statutes and Compensation for Risk, 95 INDIANA L.J. 1021, 1063 (2020). To the
extent that class treatment facilitates post-decree monitoring fees, fee-shifting statutes can provide a firm with
a financial incentive to seek class certification in an injunction-only case that it is otherwise inclined to pursue.
66 This choice would be the rational one because the expected value of each hour spent on a fee-shifting case, which
must be discounted for the risk of ineligibility for fees, is less than the expected value of a billable hour, which will be
billed to the client regardless of the outcome.
67 Presumably, if a deep-pocketed client requested that an injunction-only case be brought as a class action and agreed
to pay for the attorneys’ work on behalf of the class, a rational, profit-motivated law firmwould be inclined to accept. It
is unlikely, however, that law firms receive many such requests.
68 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
69 See Laura Beth Nielsen & Catherine R. Albiston, The Organization of Public Interest Practice: 1975–2004, 84 N.
C. L. REV. 1591, 1605–06 (2006) (estimating that “there were a little over 1,000 PILOs [public interest law
organizations] operating in the United States in 2000”). Though significant in absolute numbers, the more than
1,000 PILOs represent only a small slice of the U.S. market for legal services, which containsmore than 15,000 private
law firms that employ five ormore lawyers each. SeeGeorge P. Baker &Rachel Parkin, TheChanging Structure of the
Legal Services Industry and the Careers of Lawyers, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1635, 1650 fig. 2a (2006).
70 In a recent study, only 25 percent of a random sample of nonprofit public interest law firms received federal legal aid
funding. Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, Funding the Cause: How Public Interest Law Organizations
Fund Their Activities and Why It Matters for Social Change, 39 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 62, 78 (2014).
71 Id. at 76.
72 See Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Law: The Movement at Midlife, 60 STAN. L. REV. 2027, 2053–62 (2008).
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the remedy will address not merely the injuries suffered by a few affected individuals, but the
underlying violation itself.
2.4.1.1 Curing an Injury versus Curing the Violation
Class treatment has particular value when there is a gap between the remedy needed to cure an
individual’s injury and the remedy needed to cure the defendant’s violation. Consider, for
example, the racial segregation of K-12 (i.e., elementary and secondary) public schools. On the
one hand, the Supreme Court has held that a formerly segregated school district has “the
affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in
which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.”73 As this language makes
clear, the remedy for such a violation is a broad one. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has
also held that an injunction “must . . . be limited to the inadequacy that produced the injury in
fact that the plaintiff has established.”74 In a nonclass case, depending on the specifics of the
plaintiff’s injury and the evidence presented, the remedy that flows from this principle might be
a narrow one.75
This gap had consequences for the desegregation litigation of the 1950s and 1960s. After
students in nonclass cases proved that their school district engaged in large-scale racial discrim-
ination, some courts would issue an injunction that required only particular school assignments
for the particular plaintiff students.76 That type of remedy would leave the underlying violation
essentially intact; certainly, it would fall short of the command to eliminate racial discrimination
“root and branch.”77 From the perspective of a public interest law organization making case
selection decisions, this potential for an essentially meaningless remedy would make a nonclass
desegregation lawsuit a questionable use of its resources.78
This possibility − that the injunction available to an individual plaintiff will not address the
root cause of that plaintiff’s injury − is not specific to desegregation lawsuits. Consider a nonclass
case seeking to enjoin the National Security Agency’s metadata program, under which the NSA
“indiscriminately collect[ed] the telephone call records of millions of Americans.”79 Two
plaintiffs successfully challenged the program, obtaining a preliminary injunction against it.
That relief, however, required only that the NSA stop collecting the data from those two
claimants’ telephone accounts; it allowed the data collection to continue for millions of
others.80 A public interest law organization might not be eager to invest a substantial amount
of its limited resources in order to obtain such a meager result.
By matching the identity of the plaintiffs to the extent of the defendant’s violation, an
injunction-only class action can close this gap between individualized and comprehensive
remedies. Indeed, the drafters of Rule 23(b)(2) had this gap firmly in mind, and they perceived
73 Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cty., Va., 391 U.S. 430, 437–38 (1968).
74 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996); see also Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979) (“[T]he scope of
injunctive relief is dictated by the extent of the violation established.”).
75 See Maureen Carroll, Class Actions, Indivisibility, and Rule 23(b)(2), 99 B.U. L. REV. 59, 79 (2019).
76 DavidMarcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA.
L. REV. 657, 680 (2011).
77 See id. at 680.
78 Cf.Maureen Carroll,Class ActionMyopia, 65 DUKE L.J. 843, 859 (2016) (noting that this remedial approach “could
result in integration only after multiple lawsuits and great expense”). From the perspective of the student, this remedy
might be unattractive as well. SeeDavidMarcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for
the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657, 680 n.134 (2011) (“[I]f successful, a plaintiff would find him- or herself
the sole black student in an all-white school – hardly a pleasant prospect for the student”).
79 Klayman v. Obama, 142 F. Supp. 3d 172, 176 (D.D.C. 2015). 80 Id. at 198.
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a serious need for the class action rule to address it.81 In recent years, courts have become more
comfortable with issuing injunctions that extend beyond the plaintiff in a nonclass case.82Courts
and scholars have questioned that remedial approach,83 however, and it can be difficult to
predict whether a court will issue a broad injunction in any particular nonclass case.84 From the
perspective of a public interest law organization, a class action can thus offer a better value
proposition than a nonclass case − or series of nonclass cases − that might leave the violation
unchecked even after the plaintiffs prevail.
2.4.1.2 Providing Net Benefits versus Shifting the Harm
Beyond leaving a violation unchecked, a nonclass case might end up making things worse, at
least from other claimants’ point of view. As explained below, class treatment can help to assure
a public interest law organization that an injunction-only case will produce net benefits, as
opposed to merely redistributing the harm among fewer members of the affected group.
The potential absence of a net benefit is of particular concern in litigation against under-
funded public institutions or agencies. Consider, for example, a recent lawsuit against the US
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), which provides health care and other benefits for military
veterans. The plaintiffs sought an injunction compelling the VA to reduce the lengthy delays that
now characterize certain stages of its benefit determinations.85 If a nonclass claim of this type
were to succeed, the most straightforward way to reduce the delay facing the individual claimant
would be to move her to the front of the queue. That “line-jumping” relief would speed things up
for that individual, but it would slow things down for everyone who had been in line ahead of
her.86 A public interest law organization might not want to put its limited resources toward
obtaining that result. By contrast, a class-wide remedy could address the root cause of the delays,
benefiting all of the affected veterans at once.87
Class treatment facilitates injunctive relief that reduces rather than reallocates harm in other
types of litigation as well. Consider, for example, recent litigation seeking to improve mental
health services in Alabama prisons.88 There, the district court determined that it would be
“impossible to grant any meaningful relief on this claim without granting it on a class-wide
basis.”89 The court reasoned that an order granting relief only to a single prisoner “would rob
Peter to pay Paul; the court would be playing a zero-sum game, shifting mental-health care
81 See David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63
FLA. L. REV. 657, 700–01 (2011).
82 See Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417, 418 (2017)
(discussing this trend). These injunctions may be motivated, at least in part, by the remedial gap discussed in the text.
See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Sessions, No. 17C 5720, 2017WL 4572208, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 2017) (refusing to stay
the nationwide aspect of a preliminary injunction in a nonclass case because doing so would “allow the Attorney
General to impose what this Court has ruled are likely unconstitutional conditions across a number of jurisdictions”).
83 SeeMaureen Carroll,Class Actions, Indivisibility, and Rule 23(b)(2), 99 B.U. L. REV. 59, 105 n.263 (2019) (collecting
decisions and commentary critical of injunctions that extend beyond the plaintiff).
84 SeeMaureen Carroll, Aggregation for Me, but Not for Thee: The Rise of Common Claims in Non-Class Litigation, 36
CARDOZO L. REV. 2017, 2034 (2015) (discussing district courts’ de facto discretion over this aspect of remedial scope).
85 Godsey v. Wilkie, No. 17–4361, 2019 WL 2462344 (Vet. App. June 13, 2019). Specifically, veterans face “a multiyear
wait before [a VA regional office] even looks at an appealed case to determine whether further development and/or
adjudication is warranted before certifying and transferring a case to the Board [of Veteran’s Appeals].” Id. at *12.
86 See id. at *13 (noting the “undesirable consequence of line-jumping associated with individual petitions alleging
delay”).
87 Id. at *10 (“[P]etitions alleging systemic delay are ‘best addressed in the class-action context, where the court could
consider class-wide relief’ that would inure to all similarly situated claimants.”) (quoting Ebanks v. Shulkin, 877 F.3d
1037, 1039–40 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
88 Braggs v. Dunn, 317 F.R.D. 634 (M.D. Ala. 2016). 89 Id. at 668.
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resources from one prisoner to another.”90 By contrast, a class-wide injunction could expand the
resources available to the prisoners as a group − for example, by requiring the prison to hire
additional psychiatrists.91By facilitating systemic relief, class treatment canmake this type of case
more attractive to a public interest law organization at the outset, and it can expand the group of
people served by the litigation when it concludes.
2.4.2 Merits Decisions
Sometimes, a public interest law organization will bring a lawsuit for purposes of generating
binding legal precedent on a particular issue.92 Even when that is not the case, a firm operating
in the “private attorney general” model will generally not want a case to be dismissed before it
can be adjudicated or settled. Unless post-filing events have made clear that any decision on the
merits would be unfavorable, such a firm would likely view a non-merits dismissal (and the
resulting absence of any resolution or relief) as a waste of the resources it has invested in the
litigation.
Class treatment can help to prevent that waste of resources, especially in injunction-only
cases. Consider dismissals for lack of justiciability. In order for a federal court to have the power
to decide a case, “an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the
time the complaint is filed.”93 In particular, if the plaintiff seeks to enjoin particular conduct by
the defendant, she must show that she personally faces the threat of injury from that conduct −
not merely that the conduct harmed her in the past, nor even that it continues to harm or
threaten harm to others.94
Class certification changes the mootness analysis, shifting the focus from the named plaintiff
(as an individual) to the plaintiff class (as a group). A named plaintiff must generally have a live
claim at the time of certification, but once the class has been certified, the class representative
can continue to litigate on behalf of the class even if her personal claim becomes moot.95 At that
point, the plaintiffs can avoid a dismissal for mootness so long other members of the class have
live claims for injunctive relief.96 Consider a plaintiff who files a nonclass case alleging that her
employer has an unlawful employment policy. If she leaves her job while the case is still pending,
she cannot continue to seek an injunction against the policy.97 Instead, because her now-former
employer’s policy no longer threatens to harm her, her claim for injunctive relief will be
dismissed as moot.98 If that same plaintiff obtains class certification, however, she can continue
to seek a class-wide injunction against the challenged policy even if she later changes jobs.99
90 Id. Moreover, the court doubted that a truly individual remedy could be crafted at all: “Although the court could
order, for example, that a particular prisoner who currently requires psychiatric care be seen by a psychiatrist, it
cannot order that adequate staffing be provided to the extent necessary to address any one particular prisoner’s
mental-health care needs as they develop in the future.” Id.
91 Id.
92 Cf. Pamela S. Karlan,Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183, 201 (2003) (“The creation of
binding precedents is a beneficial byproduct of litigation A private attorney general whose activities produce
precedent is thus in some important ways more effective than a private attorney general whose activities produce
only local change.”).
93 Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975).
94 See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–02, 109 (1983).
95 See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402 & n.11 (1975).
96 Id. at 402. If the class representative’s claim has become moot, the court might revisit the question whether she will
adequately represent the class. See, e.g., DL v. D.C., 860 F.3d 713, 726 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
97 See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 72 (1997). 98 Id.
99 Cf. id. (emphasizing that the plaintiff did not sue on behalf of a class).
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Different plaintiffs will react differently to the mooting of their individual claims. For
example, someone who brings a case for purely self-interested reasons might not especially
care whether others remain subject to a policy that no longer affects her. Presumably, however,
a public interest law organization (and any client who made it through the PILO’s screening
process) would be very concerned about the policy remaining in effect.100Class treatment allows
the PILO to continue the fight, building on the resources it has already invested instead of having
to start over.
Mootness is an omnipresent concern in nonclass cases, but it looms especially large for PILOs
that represent certain types of plaintiffs, such as public school students or incarcerated persons.101
A student might graduate or move to a different school district, or a defendant might release or
transfer an incarcerated person to a different facility, before the litigation ends. In these types of
cases, using class certification as a bulwark against mootness is not so much desirable as
critical.102
Class treatment can help a PILO to avoid other barriers to merits decisions as well. For
example, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) requires a claimant to
exhaust her administrative remedies before bringing her claim to court.103 An IDEA claim-
ant’s failure to exhaust normally results in dismissal of the case. If the claimant alleges
“systemic” violations of the IDEA, however, some courts will allow the litigation to continue
in spite of the failure to exhaust.104 Although some courts have applied this exception in
nonclass cases,105 others have treated it as a “class action exception,” applicable to class
plaintiffs only.106
Consider a PILO that becomes aware of a widespread, systemic IDEA violation. If the
exception described above is unavailable, the PILO will be able to seek relief only on behalf
of those who have exhausted their administrative remedies with respect to the violation. It might
find that none of the potential claimants have done so, or that those who have done so represent
a mere fraction of those affected. Moreover, the PILO might lack the resources to shepherd the
affected individuals through the administrative process. By contrast, in courts that recognize this
exception, class treatment can enable the PILO to represent every member of the affected group,
even without undertaking individualized, resource-intensive representation of multiple claim-
ants in administrative proceedings.
100 In the context of standing to seek injunctive relief, the SupremeCourt has assumed that a plaintiff categorically lacks
a “personal stake in the outcome” if she is no longer subject to the conduct she seeks to enjoin. See, e.g., City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461U.S. 95, 101 (1983). That assumption strikes me as incorrect. Under the doctrine as it currently
stands, however, class treatment offers a second-best approach to the “personal stake” problem that Lyons and cases
like it have addressed.
101 Maureen Carroll, Aggregation for Me, but Not for Thee: The Rise of Common Claims in Non-Class Litigation, 36
CARDOZO L. REV. 2017, 2037 (2015).
102 See id. at 2037–38. Still, such cases will not uniformly suffer mootness dismissals in the absence of class treatment,
especially if brought on behalf of an organizational plaintiff or multiple individuals. See id.
103 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(i)(2)(A), 1415(l).
104 See Doe v. Arizona Dep’t of Educ., 111 F.3d 678, 681 (9th Cir. 1997) (collecting cases in which “several courts have
recognized that IDEA claims raising ‘systemic’ or ‘structural’ allegations may not need to be administratively
exhausted”). But see Parent/Prof’l Advocacy League v. City of Springfield, Massachusetts, 934 F.3d 13, 27 (1st Cir.
2019) (noting that “[o]ther circuits have defined an exception to the IDEA’s exhaustion rule for ‘systemic’ suits,” but
declining to decide whether to recognize such an exception); Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 668 F.3d 481, 494
(7th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e neither accept nor reject the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Doe [v. Arizona Department of
Education, 111 F.3d at 678.]”).
105 See, e.g., Heldman v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 148 (2d Cir.1992).
106 J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. Attica Cent. Sch., 386F.3d 107, 113 (2dCir. 2004); Jamie S. v.Milwaukee Bd. of Sch.Directors, No.
01-C-928, 2012 WL 3600231, at *4 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 20, 2012).
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2.4.3 Claimant Participation
In cases involving injunctive relief, the court and the litigants will often have a great deal of work
to do even after a finding of liability has been made. After the liability determination comes the
remedy stage, where the shaping of an injunction can require choices among different
approaches to curing the defendant’s violation. Moreover, even after the court has issued an
injunction, its enforcement can require ongoing attention to the defendant’s conduct.
Over the past few decades, public interest law organizations in the United States have
occasionally been criticized on a number of grounds related to the remedy and enforcement
stages of injunction-only cases. One such criticism relates to public interest lawyers privileging
their own views over those of the people they represent, especially with regard to the content of
injunctive relief. In desegregation cases, for example, some firms drew criticism for continuing to
prioritize racial integration as a remedy even after African American parents made clear that they
would have preferred improvements to their neighborhood schools.107
Another criticism relates to PILOs disengaging after obtaining a favorable judicial decision,
regardless of the extent to which the decision has actually affected the reality on the ground.108
Merely assuming that a defendant will obey an injunction, without further verification or
monitoring, can render a victory hollow. Indeed, some have argued that resistance to the
implementation of judicial relief severely constrains the ability of litigation to bring about
meaningful social change.109
By facilitating claimant participation in the shaping and enforcement of injunctive relief, class
treatment offers the potential for mitigating these concerns. Not only does class certification
make it easier for members of the affected group to intervene,110 but “[l]arge swaths of class action
law concern cases in which unnamed class members may monitor the proceedings, oversee class
counsel, retain individual counsel, and help mold the ultimate relief in the case.”111 The court
has discretion whether to order class-wide certification notice,112 but absent class members must
receive notice of any proposed settlement,113 and those who disagree with the proposed injunct-
ive relief will have the opportunity to lodge an objection with the court.114 Perhaps most
important, “[a] favorable judgment in a class action embraces absent class members and gives
them authority to enforce its terms.”115
Subjectively, some public interest lawyers might not appreciate all of these participation-
promoting aspects of class treatment, but they offer important safeguards against attorney
domineering and insensitivity to affected communities. With regard to remedial choices, the
airing of intraclass disagreements can produce an injunction more responsive to the views of the
claimant group. With regard to remedial implementation, the expansion of enforcement
authority can help to ensure that gains made in litigation will translate into changed conditions
on the ground. Each of these effects can improve a public interest law organization’s (abstract)
return on its (concrete) investment in the case.
107 See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation
Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
108 See Scott L. Cummings, Empirical Studies of Law and Social Change: What Is the Field? What Are the Questions?,
2013 WIS. L. REV. 171, 199–200 (2013) (discussing this critique).
109 See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (1991).
110 See Robert G. Bone, The Misguided Search for Class Unity, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 651, 703 n.222 (2014); see also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(1)(B)(iii).
111 Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Samuel Issacharoff, The Participatory Class Action, 92 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 846, 849 (2017).
112 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(A). 113 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(B). 114 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(5)(A).
115 Maureen Carroll, Aggregation for Me, but Not for Thee: The Rise of Common Claims in Non-Class Litigation, 36
CARDOZO L. REV. 2017, 2038 (2015).
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2.5 CONCLUSION
This chapter has explored the ways in which injunction-only class actions promote access to
counsel. Courts and other decision-makers would do well to keep these benefits in mind,
especially when considering steps that would affect the availability of class certification under
Rule 23(b)(2).
The history of the rulemaking process shows some success on that front. In 2001, for example,
the Advisory Committee proposed making some type of certification notice mandatory in class
actions certified under Rule 23(b)(2).116 The proposal reflected, in part, the claimant-
participation interests discussed above. In response to the proposal, public interest law organiza-
tions argued that the costs of notice would reduce their ability to bring class actions, thereby
reducing the number of claimants they would be able to serve.117 The Advisory Committee
modified the proposal, and as noted previously, the rule now gives courts discretion whether to
require certification notice for a Rule 23(b)(2) class.118 The Committee noted that this approach
was “meant to strike a fair balance between the competing concerns.”119 Whatever the merits of
the balance the Committee ultimately struck, it showed a commendable sensitivity to the
potential impact on access to counsel.
Congress has not always demonstrated that same sensitivity. In 1996, for example, it adopted
a set of restrictions on recipients of federal legal aid funding, including the prohibition on
“initiat[ing] or participat[ing] in a class action suit.”120 Lawmakers who supported the prohib-
ition argued that LSC had become focused on promoting a radical liberal agenda rather than
serving disadvantaged individuals’ legal needs.121 Even assuming the validity of that critique,122
however, prohibiting class actions throws the baby out with the bathwater. Because a class action
offers an efficient mechanism for serving many disadvantaged individuals’ needs at once, the
prohibition reduces funded organizations’ capacity to serve those individuals.123 It is past time for
116 Robert H. Klonoff,Class Actions for Monetary Relief Under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B): Does Due Process Require
Notice and Opt-Out Rights?, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 798, 828–29 (2014). The change would have applied to class
actions certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and (B) as well. Id.
117 Id. at 829.
118 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(A). As noted previously, unlike with notice of class certification, courts must order notice of
a proposed class settlement. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(B).
119 Robert H. Klonoff,Class Actions for Monetary Relief Under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B): Does Due Process Require
Notice and Opt-Out Rights?, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 798, 829 (2014) (quoting the minutes of an Advisory
Committee meeting held in May 2002); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 – Advisory Committee Note to 2003
Amendments (“The court may decide not to direct notice after balancing the risk that notice costs may deter the
pursuit of class relief against the benefits of notice.”).
120 SeeOmnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, PL 104–134, April 26, 1996, 110 Stat 1321; see
also supra note 5 and accompanying text.
121 See Mauricio Vivero, From “Renegade” Agency to Institution of Justice: The Transformation of Legal Services
Corporation, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1323, 1329–33 (2002)(discussing the history of the LSC restrictions); see also
ALAN HOUSEMAN & LINDA E. PERLE, SECURING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR ALL: A BRIEF HISTORY OF CIVIL LEGAL
ASSISTANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 36 (2018) (“[T]heCongressional majority was determined to redefine the role of
federally funded legal services by refocusing legal services advocacy away from law reform, lobbying, policy
advocacy, and impact litigation and toward basic representation of individual clients.”).
122 But see Mauricio Vivero, From “Renegade” Agency to Institution of Justice: The Transformation of Legal Services
Corporation, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1323, 1329 (2002) (explaining that “LSC statistics on annual caseloads contradict
this view”).
123 SeeDavid Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest Lawyers, 91 CAL. L. REV. 209,
224 (2003) (noting that “the vast majority of cases that legal-services lawyers turn down will never be brought by
anyone,” and thus “the [LSC] restrictions ensure that entire subgroups of low-income people will never be heard in
the legal system”).
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this restriction to be removed, so that federally funded legal aid organizations can do their jobs
more efficiently and effectively.124
As for the Supreme Court, it wrote in 2011 that Rule 23(b)(2) “does not require that class
members be given notice and opt-out rights, presumably because it is thought (rightly or
wrongly) that notice has no purpose when the class is mandatory, and that depriving people of
their right to sue in this manner complies with the Due Process Clause.”125 In light of the access-
promoting effects discussed above, it would be unfortunate if the Court continued to flirt with
this idea that mandatory Rule 23(b)(2) classes are unconstitutional. Absent class members’ due
process rights should not be weaponized against them.
This chapter has focused on the plaintiff-side benefits of injunction-only class actions, but of
course, such actions also have downsides for claimants and their counsel. Foremost among these
is preclusion, because a certified class action constrains further litigation on behalf of absent class
members, regardless of whether they win or lose.126 In addition, because plaintiffs must affirma-
tively demonstrate that they comply with the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b), law firms
(including public interest law organizations) must devote time and resources to obtaining class
certification.127 For all of the reasons discussed above, however, the benefits of injunction-only
class actions will often be worth the costs.
124 Cf.Catherine Albiston, Su Li, & Laura Beth Nielsen, Public Interest Law Organizations and the Two-Tier System of
Access to Justice in the United States, 42 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 990, 1017 (2017) (“[S]ystemic reform and rule
change may be a more efficient and cost-effective means of assisting [PILOs’] disadvantaged clients than serial
litigation of cases one at a time.”).
125 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 363 (2011).
126 Due in large part to these preclusive effects, one commentator has argued that class treatment in injunction-only
cases benefits the defendant and not the plaintiffs, and that attorneys for the plaintiffs should therefore bring such
cases solely on a nonclass basis. See Timothy Wilton, The Class Action in Social Reform Litigation: In Whose
Interest?, 63 B.U. L. REV. 597 (1983).
127 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011) (“A party seeking class certification must affirmatively
demonstrate his compliance with the Rule – that is, he must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently
numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, etc.”).
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